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ABSTRACT
Why do some political parties in Bangladesh discriminate against the Rohingya, while
some do not? Much has been written about the conflict in Myanmar, but the plight of Rohingya
in Bangladesh remains understudied. This lack of understanding is underscored by the five
million Syrian refugees fleeing their own civil war that dominates the news and the attention of
scholars. The Rohingya, however, are stateless: they are denied citizenship in their native
Myanmar and are forced to find refuge in whichever country will take them.
Much has been published that links immigration policy to security considerations and the
national identity and ethnic homogeneity of the host country. I argue that it is the domestic
politics of Bangladesh that directly influences the policies concerning, and subsequent treatment
of, the Rohingya migrants. This leads back to the question I pose: why is it that some political
parties in Bangladesh actively support the ethnic group while others actively discriminate against
the Rohingya? I argue that it is the individual ideologies of that party that can be directly
attributed to their stance on Rohingya. Using qualitative analysis, I measure how a party's
foreign policy, social policy, and political ideology affects that organization’s attitude toward
Rohingya refugees. Understanding the largely political nature of refugee policy will allow
policy-makers, intergovernmental organizations, and human rights groups to be better equipped
to improve the conditions of, not only the Rohingya population, but other vulnerable refugee
groups that seek safety in foreign states.
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iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Christopher Faulkner for making the plight of the Rohingya known to me.
Thank you to Dr. Mirilovic and the rest of my committee for teaching me the ways of the
academic. Thank you to RR for reminding me to laugh. Thank you to Eileen and Steve Schiffer
for giving me to opportunity to go to college and pursue what I love.
Thank you to Leonard Cohen, Ought, and Kamasi Washington for keeping me company.
And a most special thanks to the media outlets, human rights organizations, and scholars that are
making the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya known worldwide. Without your tireless effort and
acute focus on the abuses they face every day, the Rohingya would be wiped from their ancestral
home and the face of the Earth without a second glance.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................... 4
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS ........................................................................................ 14
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 21
THE AWAMI LEAGUE ............................................................................................................ 27
Awami League Social Values ................................................................................................................. 27
Awami League Political Ideologies ........................................................................................................ 29

THE BANGLADESH NATIONALIST PARTY ..................................................................... 36
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Social Values ........................................................................................... 36
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Political Ideologies .................................................................................. 37

JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI ................................................................................................................. 44
Jamaat-e-Islami Social Values ................................................................................................................ 44
Jamaat-e-Islami Political Ideologies ....................................................................................................... 45

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 52
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................... 53
WORKS CITED.......................................................................................................................... 54

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Independent Variables and Hypothesized Relationship with Dependent Variable ........ 26
Table 2: Independent Variables Values ........................................................................................ 26
Table 3: Parties and Respective Independent Variable Values .................................................... 26

vi

INTRODUCTION
Why do some political parties in Bangladesh discriminate against the Rohingya, while
some do not? Much has been written about the conflict in Myanmar, but the plight of Rohingya
in Bangladesh remains understudied. With estimates putting the number of Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh at 800,000, substantive research on why they are mistreated is left wanting. This
lack of understanding is underscored by the five million Syrian refugees fleeing their own civil
war that dominates the news and the attention of scholars. The Rohingya, however, are stateless:
they are denied citizenship in their native Myanmar and are forced to find refuge in whichever
country will take them. This entails perilous journeys in the Bengal Sea with potential
destination countries literally pushing them away, back out to sea. For this reason, many seek
safety in Bangladesh, which shares a small land border with Myanmar.
Much has been published that links immigration policy to security considerations and the
national identity and ethnic homogeneity of the host country. I argue that it is the domestic
politics of Bangladesh that directly influences the policies concerning, and subsequent treatment
of, the Rohingya migrants. This leads back to the question I pose: why is it that some political
parties in Bangladesh actively support the ethnic group while others actively discriminate against
the Rohingya? I believe that it is the individual ideologies of that party that can be directly
attributed to their stance on Rohingya. Using qualitative analysis, I will measure how a party's
social policy and political ideology affects that organization’s attitude toward Rohingya
refugees. Understanding the largely political nature of refugee policy will allow policy-makers,
intergovernmental organizations, and human rights groups to be better equipped to improve the
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conditions of, not only the Rohingya population, but other vulnerable refugee groups that seek
safety in foreign states.
The United Nations determines a refugee to be:
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.1
For the purpose of this study, the above UN definition of a refugee will be used to
describe the Rohingya migrants. They are the victims of sectarian persecution in Myanmar,
involving rape, displacement, and killing. They are also denied citizenship in Myanmar, further
placing them within the confines of the UN definition as “...not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence…”
Because worldwide refugee numbers are ever-increasing, this study will focus on the
Rohingya experience outside of Myanmar as a refugee in Bangladesh and act as a case study of
the implications domestic politics have on refugee populations within host countries. There is an
abundance of scholarly work on the factors that lead to immigration policy, including security,
political economy, and even domestic politics. Yet there is a lack of focus on the specific effects
that host country party politics have on refugee policy. The focus is normally placed on the
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country policy as a whole, rather than identifying the internal dynamics of the various political
voices. This study seeks to expand the literature on immigration policy by including a specific
instance of party ideologies having a direct effect on refugee public policy.
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Starting with “Operation: Dragon King” in 1977, a clear pattern of genocidal tendencies
can be found being perpetrated by the Burmese government against the Rohingya in the Rakhine
State. This pattern is identified in the report, “Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in
Myanmar”.2 The report contends that the Myanmar government is carrying out a silent genocide
against the ethnic group right under the world’s nose. Identifying specific steps in the process of
a genocide, according to Daniel Feierstein, the report then applies what the Burmese government
has done, or is attempting to do, to those steps to build their case.
In Human Rights Watch’s report on the violence against the Rohingya in the Rakhine
State, they document the promotion of ethnic violence against the minority group, coordinated
attacks and abuses, mass graves of Rohingya, humanitarian concerns, denial of citizenship, and
the legal standards of ethnic cleansing as a crime against humanity.3 For a more detailed
description and documentation of the conditions of the Rohingya in Myanmar, Chris Lewa,
coordinator for the Arakan Project, has published a report providing a background of the
Rohingya’s state in Myanmar and their reasons for fleeing to Bangladesh.4
With the scores of Rohingya moving out of the Rakhine State, a significant migrant
problem has been created in Southeast Asia. In Eileen Pittaway’s “The Rohingya Refugees in
Bangladesh: A Failure of the International Protection Regime”, she describes the shortcomings
of the global response to protect the ethnic group, with a particular focus on the status of
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de la Cour Venning, Alicia, et al. Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar.
International State Crime Initiative, 2015
3 Human Rights Watch. "All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya
Muslims in Burma's Arakan State. Human Rights Watch, 2012,"All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes Against Humanity
and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma's Arakan State.
4 The Arakan Project. Unregistered Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Crackdown, Forced Displacement and
Hunger. Asia-Pacific Refugee Rights Network, 2010.
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Rohingya in Bangladesh. She contends that the international community has been “unwilling
and unable to offer an effective solution” and that failure to act has manifested itself in
Bangladesh.5 Pittway states that three durable solutions have not been achieved: “voluntary
repatriation to the home country, local integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement in a
third country.”6
By 1978, 200,000 Rohingya had fled into Bangladesh. Because of this massive influx,
Bangladesh had to request assistance from the United Nations to help support the refugees.
Bangladesh then suspended all movement of Rohingya into the country and deemed all the
persons in the country as illegal immigrants with no official status as refugees. It was then that
the UN stepped in and threatened to withdraw aid from Burma if they did not agree to take back
the Rohingya.7 Burma reluctantly agreed, and between 1993 and 1997, 230,000 Rohingya were
forcefully returned to Burma. In an interview conducted by the UNHCR with individual
refugees, it was found that only 30 percent of Rohingya wished to return to Burma while
Bangladesh insisted that they all return.8
Local integration, Pittway contends, has also been non existent in Bangladesh. To be
locally integrated, a refugee must become members of the host society legally, economically, and
politically.9 The Bangladeshi government has made this extremely hard for the UNHRC to
achieve as Bangladesh continues to reject any sort of local integration. Not only are they denied
status as official refugees, but they are subject to sexual violence, malnutrition, and insufficient
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Regime." Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home. London: Ashgate, 2008. 83-104. Print. Law,
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6
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7
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8
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health care and education by the Bangladeshi government. This leaves the Rohingya depended
on international human rights regimes whose goal for the group is to become self-sufficient in
Bangladesh. Until the cycle of abuse stops from Bangladesh, the Rohingya will remain tethered
to the UNHCR and other groups that are already limited to act in the country. 10
Pittaway concludes with her assessment on the 3rd country resettlement of Rohingya
refugees in Bangladesh. According to her, “Resettlement has come to be seen as the only way in
which they can regain a meaningful life”.11 In 2007, the UNHCR instigated a resettlement
program for the Rohingya, but countries only accepted refugees based on their ability to integrate
into their society rather than those in greatest need.12 The trauma that they experience in
Bangladesh, the poor health status, and low levels of education all combine to make Rohingya
migrants unlikely to fit “integration criteria” of prospective host countries. 13
While the Rohingya crisis coming out of Myanmar is the most pressing instance of
protracted displacement in South Asia, there is a larger issue of displaced persons throughout the
world. In Michael G. Smith’s “Better Approaches to Protracted Displacement?” he identifies
problems in reconciling “the inherent tension between humanitarianism and realpolitik”.14 How
can a host country balance universal morality with national self-interest? Smith argues that there
are no durable solutions to protracted displacement, but enduring solutions, which require
refugees to wait and endure their situations for years without resolution.15 This acts as no
solution at all and only proves the international community’s inability to provide adequate
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protections for those in protracted displacement.16 The UNHCR has advocated against a “care
and maintenance” approach that will create a cycle of dependence on the international human
rights regimes, but few alternatives present themselves.17
In his paper, Smith identifies the Rohingya issue as a good example of protracted
displacement that, unfortunately, is one that is only fit for an enduring solution. However, he
presents four key lessons for humanitarian agencies that emerge from the crisis. First, agencies
must mobilize support and advocate greater attention for the Rohingya.18 Second, the UN in
particular must follow through with its humanitarian mandate regardless of the political
challenges.19 Third, assistance to the Rohingya needs to be combined with assistance to the local
Bangladesh communities. This will increase chances for local integration and lower animosity
between the two groups.20 Finally, immediate attention must be given to a resettlement program
as the caseload of Rohingya in Bangladesh represents a relatively small population compared to
other displaced persons in the world.21
Some explanations of the Rohingya treatment in Bangladesh can be attributed to larger
issues of democratization, or the lack thereof, in Southeast Asia that can affect immigration
policy. Stephen Castles provides theories relating to the issues of migration, citizenship, and
ethnicity. Castles goes on to describe the fragile relationship between democratization and
citizen rights, which he sees as being affected by “immigration and the development of new
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forms of ethno-cultural diversity”.22 According to Castles, the more heterogeneous its
population is in terms of ethnicity, the harder it is to build a democratic system of government.
Therefore, immigration, the adding of new ethnicities to the pool of residents in the state, will
hinder that state’s ability to achieve democracy.23 This can, in turn, lead young, developing
states to adopt restrictive immigration policies or harsh laws on migrants once they are in the
country. He applies this to Southeast Asia in three ways.
First, the European model of homogeneity and the theory of the “nation-state” did not
have the time it needed to develop in Asia. No autonomous cities developed that could challenge
the power of the rulers as what happened in Europe. Instead, peasant rebellions merely
established new dynasties that did not change the political structure.24 Second, the notion of the
nation - state and citizenship was brought to the region through colonialism, a practice marred by
repression, racism, and exploitation. This can be seen in Bangladesh with the presence of Great
Britain in the 19th century. While the colonial liberation movements attempted to take over the
government system put in place by the colonial powers, the democratic citizen had not evolved
in the region to translate that liberation into a successful, western democracy - type government.
Dictatorships and authoritarianism became widespread.25 Finally, the states in Southeast Asia
did not have time to homogenize the way Western states did in order to implement successful
democracy. Many times, the labor movement spurred by colonialists brought ethnicities from
other countries into new regions that further muddled the ethnic homogeneity of the country.26
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Transnational Communities Programme, 1998.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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This can also be seen in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Myanmar when the British needed men
to tend the colonial rice fields.
In another paper by Castles, “Why Migration Policies Fail”, he argues that “difficulties in
implementing migration policies arise to a large extent from the interactions… between the
political systems of the states involved”.27 Castles goes on to describe the factions in a political
system and how their perceptions of migrants can lead to discord in the government and result in
contradictory and ineffective immigration policy. Migration can be seen as advantageous by
some groups, and a threat to others. Some people may see migrant settlement in their
neighborhoods as harmful “because they feel it will worsen housing conditions, while others may
see immigration as a source of urban renewal and a more vibrant cultural mix.”28 According to
Castles, “Politicians, social movements and the media all have a role in shaping and directing
people's reactions to migration.”29 However, “The strength of nationalism and racism in
immigration countries has made it easier to mobilize public opinion against immigration than for
it.”30
As a developing country, Bangladesh must consider immigration in the larger scheme of
its nation building process. Like what Castles argues, Harris Mylonas agrees that ethnic and
national homogeneity are necessary to build a nation state. Immigration throws a wrench into
this process by adding new ethnicities and nationalities to the mix. Mylonas argues that the
“core group” in the host country, the inhabitants of the country that share the same national type,
is represented by the ruling elite in that country. That ruling elite aims at the survival of the state
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and their position in it and will not rest until the nation building is complete, which entails the
removal or silencing of all threatening non-core actors in the state. The ruling elite is driven by a
homogenizing imperative.31 Mylonas puts forth a few theories regarding immigration policies in
these nation building states.
First, he looks at the state capacity in absolute terms. Does the state have the ability to
implement its nation building policies, or not? If they do not, they will attempt an
accommodationist stance as the state apparatus does not have the ability to fully assimilate the
non-core group into the core group.32 Next, Mylonas puts forth the idea that the salience and
homogeneity of the non-core group in question will have an impact on their treatment by the
ruling class of the host country. If the group is nomadic, isolated, and/or small, members will
quickly assimilate into the upper echelons of the core group to increase their social esteem.
Otherwise, if the non-core group is very strong in their ethnic, religions, or territorial bond, the
core group will act more hostile to the non-core group and see it as a threat. The non-core group
will seek to establish a beachhead in the host country with a political identity in the form of
cultural, linguistic, and religious links. The ruling class of the host country will fear external
powers supporting the non-core group in an attempt to destabilize the country.33 Finally,
Mylonas describes how the political demands of the non-core group can influence their
subsequent treatment in the host country. Demands can range from non-territorial rights, such as
recognition as citizens and political participation, to territorial demands in which the non-core
group claims autonomy or independence from the state. Conversely, demands from the non-core
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group can be influenced by their treatment from the host country. Violence directed at the noncore group can lead to an escalation of the group's demands unless they are totally suppressed.34
Politics and ideology are discussed by Russell as an overlooked factor when seeking out
the determinants of immigration policy. In her case study of Kuwait, Russell sees politics and
political interest groups “at the intersection of objectives and determinants” of migration
policy.35 Political actors will perceive the different aspects of the migrant group, particularly
their labor impact, as either favorable to their agenda or unfavorable and act accordingly. She
goes on to describe how members of the Kuwaiti merchant elites and the newer commercial
interests have pushed for liberal entry policies, then restrictive rights once they are in the
country. These groups will also oppose naturalization.36 Conversely, Kuwaiti Nationalists,
comprising of the poorer members of society, tend to support policies that restrict the entry of
foreign nationals and oppose giving rights to the ones who reside in the country.37 In addition to
the labor considerations of political actors, recent political events, security issues, economic
conditions, demographic change, positions of political actors in policy making process, and
perceived social costs and consequences of immigration all need to be taken into account when
governments adopt the immigration policies that they do.38
Russell’s theory does well to highlight the need to pay attention to ideology and politics
of state actors as shaping the direction of the immigration phenomenon. However, Russell’s
argument assumes that the migrants are moving into the host state to solely seek employment.
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Political actors and interest groups build their opinions of the migrants based the impact they will
make on the labor market. Refugees are largely kept out of the equation as they may seek
employment, citizenship, and asylum from a hostile and dangerous home state. These other
aspects of the immigrant needs and demands must be taken into account.
Regime type is discussed as an important predictor in immigration policy by Nikola
Mirilovic. Making a comparison between democracies and dictatorship, he argues that while
many immigrants would prefer to live in the former, the demand for immigrants is higher in the
latter.39 In democracies, immigrants are given access to the welfare state and are granted
political rights that inherently make living in the state a better option. However, immigration
policy in these countries remain restrictive, whereas in dictatorships, there is a permissive policy
towards migrant admissions. Bangladesh, however, does not fall into the polar regime types that
he describes in his theory. The country has a history of vacillating between authoritarian rule
and liberal democracy. Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the internal dynamics of the
Bangladeshi political systems, namely the political parties.
Western democracies, having the most developed political institutions and party
ideologies, provide an important setting for looking at the effects of party politics and ideology
on immigration policy. Gallya Lahav argues that ideological orientations and party affiliation
structure elite attitudes towards the immigration issue in Europe.40 Looking at members of
European parliament, Lahav has found that elites from the different parties have attitudes that are
distinct.41 The “left-right construct” organizes policy makers when it comes to preferences of
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migrants and the policies that govern them.42 She has found that policy makers on the left are
more likely to amend social inequalities that migrants face and seek to extend their rights than
their counterparts on the right.43 Her report flies in the face of recent assertions that party
affiliation and ideology have eroded and have become largely symbolic when deciding policy in
Europe. Lahav has found that parties and their ideologies have remained significant in
immigration discourse and continue to shape the dialogue on immigrant entry.44 She debunks
the idea that the creation of a European parliament and intergovernmental framework somehow
antiquates party affiliation and ideology. These ties to ideas and perceptions of culture still
inform the decision making when it comes to immigration policy.
As well as Lahav makes the case for party affiliation and ideology as a predictor for
immigration policy, her argument is limited to the borders of Europe and advanced Western
international governance. Bangladesh is a country that formed in the latter half of the 20th
century and lacks the hundreds of years it took for complex democratic institutions to form. The
country is prone to regime change and does not have the stability required for political discourse
that does not result in either a coup or civil war. This paper seeks to make the case for party and
ideology as a predictor for immigration policy in the context of a lesser developed country.

42
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Immigration and refugee populations have been the subject of a myriad amount of studies
and scholarly attention. Security issues, the wealth of the host nation, and ethnic differences are
all cited as useful and proven justifications for a restrictive and discriminatory policy against
immigrants and refugees. However, most of the literature concerns host states that are Western,
advanced democracies, like the United States and European Union countries. These states have
had hundreds of years to establish stable, democratic institutions that have evolved over time and
are able to withstand political discourse and competition without falling victim to a coup or a
regime change. Bangladesh presents an interesting case because it does not have the advanced
hallmarks of democracy, like free and fair elections, independent branches of government, or
healthy political competition. Therefore, it deserves a unique lens through which to study its
immigration policy, particularly concerning the Rohingya. In immigration literature, it is argued
that security, economic policy, and ethnic differences provide the reasons behind a state’s
immigration policy. I argue that these factors as explanations do not apply to Bangladesh.
Security is the most commonly used justification for an immigration policy. This can be
seen in the Trump Administration’s attempted block of migrants from Muslim-majority countries
and Syrian refugees in the United States and the National Front’s platform of restricted
immigration in France. The literature can serve these cases just fine as they are countries that
have experienced considerable terrorist attacks from people who were not citizens of the state,
the September 11 attacks in the United States, and the multiple terror attacks in France since the
rise of the Islamic State in 2015. However, when applying this analytical framework to a
country like Bangladesh, the pieces do not fit together as nicely as they do in other cases.
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Christopher Rudolph is among one of the scholars that argues there is a significant
security concern when states enact immigration policy. He admits, though, that many of the
theories he posits do not apply to developing countries. This is because his theses are
interwoven with political economy considerations that are really only applicable in advanced,
Western, industrialized nations.45
In Utpala Rahman’s “The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh”, the
Rohingya migrant is a threat to the internal stability of Bangladesh and a source of inter-state
tension between the country and Myanmar. She portrays the refugee group as a political,
economic, social, environmental, and human security threat. The solution, according to Rahman,
is for Bangladesh to enact a policy that will lift the Rohingya migrants from their current state of
despondency in order to keep them out of encampment and subsequent militarization.46
Rahman contends that the Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar are fertile grounds for
recruitment by Islamic militants.47 The Rohingya Solidarity Organization, a militant
organization created by the Rohingya minority in Myanmar to achieve independence, has moved
into Bangladesh with the thousands of others escaping Rakhine. The RSO now operates in
Bangladesh with support from other Islamic militant groups in the country, most notably the
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).48 Rahman continues to state that the Rohingyas
protracted status in refugee camps only bolster their ties to armed groups that seek to harm the
government and people of Bangladesh.
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Rahman also sees the Rohingya as competing with Bangladeshis workers for jobs on the
Myanmar - Bangladesh border that, in turn, creates hostilities and lead to clashes between ethnic
groups.49 In addition, the large amounts of Rohingya place a strain on the already limited
resources in the area, contributing to tensions between “newcomers and native populations”.50
This resource strain can also be seen in the environmental degradation of the area as refugees cut
down timber to build shelters. This places the Rohingya in direct competition with the native
Bangladeshis who also depend on the natural resources in the area for their livelihood.51
First, the security threat the Bangladesh faces is almost all internal. The product of a
brutal liberation war in 1971, Bangladesh has a history of rape, murder, and genocide woven into
its history of a sovereign nation. During the conflict, the Yahya Khan regime of Pakistan sent
his troops to Dhaka, the capital city of the Bengali nationalists and unleased a large siege of the
city for two days.52 According to eyewitness accounts, 15,000 Bengalis had lost their lives, the
most notable being the murder of 17 professors and 200 students on the Dhaka University
campus.53 The results of the war left a significant number of Pakistani supporters in Bangladesh
after the war to represent the interests of Pakistan. Most notably, the Jamaat-e-Islamic political
party, which fought on the side of Pakistan during the war and was charged with committing
some of the worst atrocities during the conflict, including the murder of the Bengali intellectuals
in March of 1971.54 Rather than expressing political differences in a setting of peaceful
discourse, Bangladesh has been plagued by the expression of political activism in the form of

49

Ibid.
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52 Jahan, Rounaq. “Genocide in Bangladesh.” Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited
by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, Routledge, 2009.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
50

16

political terrorism. One of the most notable occurred in 2004 when fundamentalist Islamist
terrorists from Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami perpetrated a grenade attack against the Awami League
leadership during an anti-terrorism rally. The man behind the attacks was Mufti Abdul Hannan,
a Bangladeshi citizen.55
Second, the RSO that Rahman contends poses a threat to Bangladeshi national security
has been long defunct. Formed as a response to the Burmese military’s crackdown in the late
1970s, the RSO was just one of the nationalist groups that was formed by Rohingya after the
refugee crisis and the dismal conditions they were subject to. Seeking to secure greater rights for
the Rohingya within Burma, the organization was targeted as a terrorist organization by the
Burmese government.56 With purported and dubious claims of having ties with Jamaat-e-Islami
and other extremist organizations, the RSO was largely confined to the Cox’s Bazar area of
Bangladesh that held the major population centers for Rohingya migrants in the country. From
there, the RSO carried out localized military attacks against the Burmese forces that were
responsible for the atrocities in the Rakhine State.57 The organization experienced a permanent
decline in 2001 when the Bangladeshi government targeted the group’s training camps.58 By
promulgating this myth of Rohingya terrorism, the government of Myanmar has caught the
attention of established terror networks, like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, and Jamaah Ansharut
Tauhid. These groups have expressed solidarity with the plight of the Rohingya and have called
for attacks on the Burmese military and Buddhists in Myanmar.59 This is negative publicity that
affects the Rohingya’s credibility as a vulnerable group. And as a vulnerable group, they have
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been largely insulated against the wider Islamic world, making any claim of ties to international
terror networks extremely far-fetched.
Finally, the claims of worker conflict in Bangladesh between Bangladeshi workers and
Rohingya is also overexaggerated, if not outright false. There is no competition for work in
Rohingya population centers in Bangladesh because they Bangladeshi government is not letting
the Rohingya work.60
Many will argue that Bangladesh is being hostile to Rohingya refugees because they are a
poor, densely populated state that cannot sustain the addition of hundreds of thousands of more
people. While it is objectively true to state that Bangladesh may not be able to absorb the
migrants into their state without extreme strain put on resources, to make a blanket statement
about all the political voices as sharing that opinion is misguided. There are many different
voices coming from major opposition parties that are not in power and cannot enact official
policy. The purpose of this study is to investigate why different political parties in Bangladesh
are treating the Rohingya differently.
Gary Freeman makes the argument that a state’s welfare status determines their
immigration policy. He posits that, because the welfare state has to provide extensively for its
citizens, it will react negatively to the addition of more citizens as it will eventually become
impossible for the state to sustain its social programs. The state must insulate itself from the
labor that flows from state to state in an open immigration system.61 However, Freeman’s theory
assumes that each state has a homogenous political attitude that either supports the idea of a
welfare state or denies it outright. For socially democratic states like Norway, Denmark, and
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Sweden, the theory fits nicely as the provisions of a welfare state are woven into the country’s
identity. The theory, however, does not account for politically heterogenous states like
Bangladesh that consistently vacillate between liberal and socialist economic structures. It is
necessary, therefore, to understand the individual policies and ideologies of each party to fully
understand what determines their immigration policy, particularly concerning the Rohingya.
It is argued that the ethnic makeup of a state will determine its reception of immigrants.
According to popular and scholarly belief, if the immigrant group’s ethnicity is different than the
host state’s, then the host state will pursue restrictive policies against that immigrant group. That
Bangladesh has pursued a restrictive and discriminatory policy against the Rohingya is a sign of
their ethnic differences with the migrant group is false for two reasons. First, the Rohingya share
almost the same ethnicity as native Bengali’s, as well as religious beliefs. While there is
significant political discourse surrounding the ethnicity and history of the Rohingya in Western
Myanmar, it is agreed upon by a majority of anthropology and historical scholars that the group
is descended from a variety of Arab Muslim traders who came to the Arakan Kingdom in the 8th
century A.D.62 The Arakan Kingdom, at the height of its existence, comprised of the land
stretching from Chittagong (present day Bangladesh) to the present day Rakhine State in
Myanmar.6364 Second, there is variation within the political discourse as to the policy that should
be taken against the Rohingya. There are parties out of the ruling government that take very
different stances on the Rohingya than the ruling powers.
While flawed in its assumptions of American identity and culture, Samuel Huntington
has been the biggest proponent of identity and ethnicity differences as an obstacle to
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immigration. He posits that Hispanic migration into the United States is problematic because it
would be impossible for them to assimilate into the American identity.65 This is a case study that
provides a micro empirical example of a macro principle: ethnicity and identity are key
determinants to immigration policy. While some would argue that this can be applied to justify
the treatment of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, it cannot because the Rohingya possess the same
ethnic characteristics of the Bengali population as well as the language. Both peoples are
considered Indo-Aryan both ethnic-wise and linguistically. Because of their shared ethnic
identity and culture, it is impossible for people to argue that it is identity clashes that keep the
Bangladeshi government from accepting Rohingya refugees.
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HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
There has been extensive research on the subjects of security, national identity, ethnicity,
and democratization as determining most of the immigration policy that states create. What is
lacking in analysis and consideration as a determinant to immigration law is domestic party
politics, specifically in developing countries where democratic institutions, such as political
parties, amount to little more than factions vying for control of the country. Such is the case in
Bangladesh. While there are multiple political factions in the country, three dominate the
political discourse in the state: the Awami League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and Jamaate-Islami. The Awami League has confronted the Rohingya migrants with discriminatory
policies. As the ruling party, there have been repatriations conducted, documented by the United
Nations, relocations to uninhabitable regions, criticized by human rights groups, and an
unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as refugees, per the official statements of the party
leaders.6667 The Bangladesh National Party have expressed support for the Rohingya and call for
the ruling Awami League to provide shelter to the minority group.68 In addition to voicing their
support, the BNP is calling for the United Nations to issue a resolution condemning Myanmar for
their treatment of the Rohingya and provide aid and resources to Bangladesh in order to provide
shelter for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, something the Awami League has failed to
accomplish.69 Jamaat-e-Islami has also expressed support for the Rohingya. In a press release,
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the party has urged the Bangladesh government to allow the Rohingya to enter the country on
humanitarian grounds.70 In addition, the Islamist party has called for the following:
…the UN, OIC, all international forums and organizations, human rights watchdogs and
most particularly the Muslim countries and the peace loving people around the world to
create pressure upon the Myanmar government to stop ongoing massacre and genocide,
to take the Rohingya Muslims back in their home, to restore their citizenship and to
ensure their all out safety.71
I believe it is the competition and individual ideologies of these groups that determine the
treatment of the Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh.
What, then, can account for the differences in the parties that subsequently lead to the
treatment of the migrants? Why do some parties in Bangladesh discriminate against the
Rohingya while others do not? My hypotheses state there are two main variables, in the form of
party policy, that lead to either their support for the minority group or animosity: their social
values and political ideologies. There are those that argue Bangladesh, like much of South Asia,
is not equipped to handle large influxes of refugees because a strong civil society has not
developed, the already high population density, and their absence from most international
frameworks on refugee treatment. Therefore, it is expected that the country would pursue
restrictionist and exclusionary policies towards the migrants. I will be able to control for these
alternative explanations by highlighting the very different approaches each political party takes
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towards Rohingya migrants, proving that there is variation when it comes to refugee policy in the
country.
My hypotheses are as follows: first, a party’s social values impact their policy towards
the Rohingya migrants. Second, a party’s political ideologies will impact their policy towards
Rohingya migrants. The party’s social values, in the form of a relationship with Islam will
impact their stance on Rohingya migrants in the following way: the warmer a political party is
towards Islam, the warmer their policy is towards the Rohingya. This can be explained in the
following way: the Rohingya are a Muslim group, therefore, the more aligned with Islam a party
is, the warmer their stance toward the Rohingya will be. Jonathan Fox’s research corroborates
this idea that the religion of the policy making group can affect the treatment of another group.
He has found that when a minority group’s religion differs from that of a culturally similar
majority, discriminatory policies can be expected to be enacted by the majority group.72 Over
the past few decades, a substantial Rohingya diaspora has developed in Southeast Bangladesh,
establishing cultural bonds between the people of the two countries.
Finally, I believe that the political ideologies of each party, which can be measured by
their nationalistic bent and position on democratic government, will influence their stance on
Rohingya migrants in the following ways: I expect that the more nationalistic a party, the more
receptive a party will be of Rohingya migrants. I expect that the warmer a party is towards
democracy, the warmer a party will be towards Rohingya migrants. I also include two
complimentary variables to a party’s political ideologies: foreign policy will compliment a
party’s nationalistic bent and economic policy will compliment a party’s democratic bent.
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Normally, as a nationalistic party, immigrants and refugees would be seen as unwanted
and muddying the national homogeneity of the country. In the context of Bangladesh, however,
a country’s nationalistic bent plays a backseat role to the factor of party competition. For
example, the BNP is a nationalistic party, but opposes the liberal and global oriented Awami
League who pursues discriminatory policies against the Rohingya. Therefore, the BNP, while
nationalistic, adopts accommodationist policies towards the Rohingya, for the purpose of
standing against the Awami League’s restrictions policies. The BNP also represents the identity
of the Bangladeshi people, which in years since independence, has meant ethno-religious
identification. Belonging to the same religion and sharing the same ethnic qualities, the
Rohingya are a part of the “nation” that the BNP purports to represent the interests of.
Foreign policy goes hand-in-hand with nationalism. This can be explained in the
following way: Prime Minister Modi in India, through his “Act East Policy” has sought to
strengthen ties, both economic and militarily with ASEAN nations, most notably
Myanmar.73 Because of this policy goal, Prime Minister Modi has been skeptical of the reports
accusing Myanmar of sponsoring violence against the Rohingya in the Rakhine State, preferring
to allow Myanmar to solve the problem internally. India views the Rohingya crisis as
Myanmar’s problem, not the surrounding states. Naturally, any political ally of India would
adopt a similar stance. As far as Pakistan, Mylonas’ theory that an external power can affect a
host state’s policy towards a migrant group comes into play. His theory states that the if the
external power, Pakistan in this case, is an adversary of the host state, Bangladesh, and supports
the immigrant group, then the host state will adopt restrictionist policies towards that immigrant
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group, the Rohingya in this case.74 Mylonas’ theory holds true, conversely, in that parties that
are pro-Pakistan have a much warmer attitude toward Rohingya migrants.
Bangladesh has a unitary system of governance with a Westminster-styled parliamentary
government. There are 350 seats to be filled by parliament members elected in different districts
using by a plurality of votes. Elections are scheduled to happen every five years, but turmoil and
violence often delay the voting process. In the latest election in 2014, there was only a 22%
voter turnout as the BNP-led opposition boycotted the election.75 The Prime Minster is the head
of government and the cabinet. The President is the head of state, but the office has largely been
reduced to a ceremonial role. As Gary Freeman points out, democratic states are more likely to
adopt liberal and inclusionary policies towards immigrants. The policy makers in Bangladesh,
according to Freeman, are vote maximizers that seek to please organized interest groups that
favor immigration, rather than the general public who will be less excited about the prospect of
immigrant inclusion.76
This can also explain why parties who favor a free and private economy would have a
warm stance towards Rohingya: a liberal democracy means a free economy that has business
interests that inclusionary immigration policies would be conducive to. Those business interests
will prove strong organized groups that can influence policy makers.
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Table 1: Independent Variables and Hypothesized Relationship with Dependent Variable

Political Ideologies Variables
Nationalism

Parties that have a nationalistic bent will have a warmer stance on
Rohingya migrants.

Democracy

Parties that have a democratic bent will have a warmer stance on
Rohingya migrants.

Social Values Variables
Relationship with
Islam

Parties with a warmer relationship with Islam will have a warmer stance
on Rohingya migrants.

Table 2: Independent Variables Values

Independent variables

Independent variable values

Social Values

Pro-Islam or Secular

Political Ideologies

Nationalistic or Not nationalistic
Democratic or Not democratic

Table 3: Parties and Respective Independent Variable Values

Party
Awami League
BNP
Jamaat-e-Islami
Awami League
BNP
Jamaat-e-Islami

Variable value
Social Policy Variables
Secular
Pro-Islam
Pro-Islam
Political Ideology Variables
Not nationalistic
Not democratic
Nationalistic
Democratic
Not nationalistic
Democratic
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AWAMI LEAGUE
Awami League Social Values
Because Bangladesh is a majority Muslim state, each major political party in the country
is forced to hold a stance on the religion. While Bangladesh was founded as a secular state, both
civilian and military, secular and non-secular in their political platforms, governments have
moved away from that idea, recognizing Bangladesh as a Muslim-majority state.77 For the
purposes of this study and because of the reason just mentioned, I will use each party’s specific
party platform on Islam to operationalize their social values. According to my hypothesis, if the
political party in question has a warm relationship with Islam, their attitude towards the
Rohingya will be positive, and the opposite will be true if they are more secular. This study will
consider a relationship with Islam “warm” if the party recognizes it as the state religion, and
“cold” if they do not.
First, I will look at the Awami League’s relationship with Islam. According to most
scholars and historians, Bangladesh was founded as a secular nation, attempting to distance itself
with the more Islamic-oriented Pakistan. As the first governing party in the state’s history, the
Awami League has always maintained itself as a secular and moderate party compared with the
BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, its main competitors. According to the party’s constitution,
secularism is one of its fundamental principles.78 Despite the Awami League’s official stance on
religion, many of its members and supporters do practice Islam. However, because they do not
recognize it as the state religion, those opposed to the Awami League accuse it of being actively
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anti-Islam. While this is not true, the Awami League has taken steps that Bengalis may view as
opposed to Islam, such as the ICT set up by the party to prosecute members of Jamaat-e-Islami.
Many of the mem convicted were prominent Islamic scholars and leaders, active in the Muslim
community in Bangladesh.79
Due to the Awami Leagues secular relationship with Islam, they are less interested in
helping the Rohingya than the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, who have an incentive to help the
migrants as they share a similar religious identity. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority
concentrated in the West of Myanmar, a majority Buddhist country. The largest rationale behind
the violence against the Rohingya in the Rakhine state has, therefore, been sectarian. This
religiously fueled violence has rallied the Muslim world in support of the Rohingya, including
the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami.8081 The Rohingya have not seen the same support from the
Awami League due to the fact they have no sectarian ally in the party. In addition, the Awami
League has reason to suppress the migrants in Bangladesh as they pose an electoral threat to the
party. The Rohingya are concentrated in areas that are BNP and Jamaat strongholds. With the
sectarian support the BNP and Jamaat can provide, the Rohingya see them as their dog in the
political fight. As the Awami League tightens their grip on control of the country, it would serve
their best interest to strip the Rohingya of any means to support their opposition electorally.82
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Awami League Political Ideologies
Finally, I will discuss the Awami League’s political ideologies’ effect on their policies
concerning the Rohingya migrants. According to my hypothesis, the political ideology variable
is operationalized as a party’s sense of nationalism and whether or not the party has been a
defender of democracy in Bangladesh. I have posited that the relationship between the variables
mentioned and a party’s attitude towards Rohingya migrants will be as follows: if a party is
nationalistic, they will have a warmer stance on Rohingya migrants; if a party is a defender of
democracy, they will have a warmer stance on Rohingya migrants. I have also included
complimentary variables that will help further explain the links between political ideologies and
migrant attitude. As a compliment to nationalism, a party’s foreign policy has proven to be
important to consider when gauging their treatment of the Rohingya migrants. I posit that when
a party eschews nationalistic rhetoric and implements policy of that nature, they tend to be more
pro-Pakistan as well as opposed to India. Also, as a complimentary variable to a party’s
democratic bent, I posit that when a party is a proponent of liberal democracy, they will also
follow suit in their economic policies, favoring a less regulated market. When a party has a more
restrictive view of the democratic process and free elections, they will favor a more regulated,
welfare-based economy.
Awami League Nationalism
Due to the fact that Bangladesh was born out of a war of liberation from Pakistan, a
current of nationalism has run through the country since its inception in 1971. The Awami
League has been no exception to that patriotism. However, since regaining power in 2009, the
party has had to counter the nationalism of BNP with its own brand of globalism in an effort to
open up Bangladesh to the rest of the world. This is illustrated by Bangladesh’s recent outreach
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into regional connectivity under the leadership of the Awami League, and, most importantly, its
willingness to work with India, one of the world’s largest economies. Under the leadership of
the Awami League, Bangladesh has maintained its member status in the Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a regional international
organization designed to foster technological and economic cooperation among Bay of Bengal
states. The Awami League also oversaw the opening of the BIMSTEC Permanent Secretariat in
Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka.83 Additionally, the ruling Awami League has been accused of
maintaining trade relationships with India that are unfavorable to Bangladesh, an accusation
corroborated by the Awami League’s overtures since regaining power in 2009.84
It is because, in part, of the Awami League’s globalist ideologies that they have pursued
discriminatory policies against the Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh. The globally-minded
politics and regionally deal making of the Awami League has opened the Bangladesh
government and their decision making up to the influences of other states, leading to the policies
they have implemented against the Rohingya migrants. This is most notable in the party’s
growing affinity for Prime Minister Modi’s India. The burgeoning partnership between
Bangladesh and India means an aligning of values and goals. Modi’s “Act East” plan that seeks
to kindle a relationship with ASEAN nations pulls Bangladesh into the alliance, also. Because
Modi has expressed the opinion that Myanmar has the sole responsibility to handle the Rohingya
crisis, the Awami League has taken the same position in the form of repatriations and the
elimination of pull factors in East Bangladesh. As mentioned earlier, the BIMSTEC regional
organization also joins Bangladesh and Myanmar. It would be in the best interest for Bangladesh
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to keep itself from chastising Myanmar, also a member state, or caring for their ethnic cleansing
refugees. Rather, the Awami League has widely chosen to allow Myanmar to handle it internally
and minimize the amount of Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh.
Awami League Foreign Policy
Currently the ruling party in Bangladesh, the Awami League is the prime example of a
political party in Bangladesh that has pursued discriminatory policies against the Rohingya
migrants. Led by Prime Minister Hasina, I posit that this is due to their values and ideologies as
a political party, specifically their foreign policy, social values, and political ideology. First, I
will discuss their foreign policy as having a causal relationship with their treatment of Rohingya
migrants. Namely, the party’s diplomatic ties with India and Pakistan, two states that have a rich
and complex history with Bangladesh and serve as some of the largest wedges between the
parties I will discuss. I hypothesize that if a party takes a pro-India stance, they will be more
likely to pursue discriminatory policies against Rohingya migrants, where the opposite will be
true if a party does not take a pro-India stance.
Since Bangladesh’s inception after the Liberation War in 1971, the Awami League has
always viewed India as a friend. This is due in large part to India’s intervention on the side of
the Bangladesh independence movement during the war, led by the Awami League. IndianAwami relations were once again rekindled during the 2014 election in Bangladesh that saw
India play a large role in their support for the Awami League. According to Kumar, “There was
a widespread perception that India had openly supported the Awami League’s continuation in
power.”85 This has involved barring other political parties from participating in elections and
creating controversial tribunals to punish those who the Awami League deem committed war
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crimes on the side of Pakistan during the Liberation War, many of whom were leaders of Jamaate-Islami.86
Much of the mutual goodwill between the Awami League and India can be attributed to
their shared history with Pakistan. As the leaders of the independence movement during the
Liberation War, the Awami League has historically viewed Pakistan as an adversary. This is
further illustrated by the war crimes tribunal created by the Awami League to prosecute
individuals seen as supporting Pakistan during the civil war. In 2012, The International Crimes
Tribunal (ICT) began convicting those deemed as having committed war crimes during the
conflict. Very prominent members of Jamaat-e-Islami and BNP were convicted by the court,
including former leaders of Jamaat, Ghulam Azam and Motiur Rahman Nizami. The courts
methods, however, have been called deeply flawed and problematic with direct government
intervention on the side of the prosecution.87 The court also reopened old wounds between the
two countries that both sides have worked to close over the decades since the conflict ended.88
Those convicted were mostly comprised of opposition party members and Islamic scholars who
supported an undivided Pakistan at the time of the Liberation War.
As stated, it is my hypothesis that a party with a pro-India stance will pursue
discriminatory policies against Rohingya migrants. This holds true for the Awami League in that
their historical friendship with India is directly influencing their harsh attitudes towards the
Rohingya coming out of Myanmar. This is illustrated by Indian Prime Minister Modi’s “Act
East Policy” that has sought to strengthen ties, both economic and militarily with ASEAN
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nations, most notably Myanmar.89 Because of this policy goal, Prime Minister Modi has been
skeptical of the reports accusing Myanmar of sponsoring violence against the Rohingya in the
Rakhine State, preferring to allow Myanmar to solve the problem internally. India views the
Rohingya crisis as Myanmar’s problem, not the surrounding states. Naturally, any political ally
of India would adopt a similar stance, in this case, the Awami League in Bangladesh. In an
effort to court India and Modi, the Awami League has confronted the Rohingya migrants with
discriminatory policies. As the ruling party, there have been repatriations conducted,
documented by the United Nations, relocations to uninhabitable regions, criticized by human
rights groups, and an unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as refugees.9091
My hypothesis also states that a party that does not have a pro-Pakistan stance will pursue
discriminatory policies against the Rohingya. This holds true in the case of the Awami League.
Illustrated by the problematic war crimes tribunal, the party’s warm relationship with India, and
the opposite sides the Awami League and Pakistan took during the Liberation War, Bangladesh
has exhibited a cold relationship with Pakistan. My hypothesized relationship between the
Awami League’s view of Pakistan and their attitude toward the Rohingya can summarized by
Harris Mylonas’ theory on the link between a host state’s foreign policy and a foreign group of
people. Mylonas posits that when a host state encounters an enemy-supported group, the ruling
political elites will not accommodate this group. This is because the host state may interpret the
foreign group as a future fifth column for the adversary state.92 This has been seen in
Bangladesh where the ruling Awami League has refused to accommodate and assimilate the
Rohingya migrants.
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Awami League Democracy
One of the largest criticisms of the Awami League has been their aggressive
consolidation of power by highly undemocratic means. In the run-up to the 2014 national
elections, the party cracked down on the opposing BNP and placed their leader, Khaleda Zia,
under house arrest, all but ensuring the Awami League would run unopposed in the election.
One of many bodies and states criticizing the election, the UN’s Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
called the vote neither peaceful nor inclusive.93 In response to the flawed elections, BNP leader
Zia called the Awami League-led government both autocratic and illegal. She also called for the
immediate abdication of the leadership by the Awami League.94 Freeman’s theory can also be
used to identify the relationship between the Awami League’s strained relationship with
democracy and their policy towards the Rohingya migrants.
According to Freeman, parties in liberal, democratic states are vote-maximizers that seek
to please organized interest groups that favor immigration, rather than the general public who
will be less excited about the prospect of immigrant inclusion.95 Illustrated by the election
turmoil in 2014, the Awami League is less concerned with maximizing votes than undermining
the democratic process to their advantage. When a party removes all opposition, there is less
competition for votes, making the need to satisfy any type of base less important. The possible
base, in this case, being Rohingya migrants and their supporters.
Awami League Economic Policy
One of the founding principles of the Awami League in Bangladesh was democratic
socialism, an economic ideology envisioned by the party, but one that has yet to surface in the
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poverty-stricken country. While the economy has shown steady signs of improving, there have
been consistent labor disputes and hostile worker-owner relations in the garment industry that
takes the lion’s share of the country’s economy.96 Despite this, the Awami League maintains in
its “Vision 2021” political manifesto that by the nation’s 50th anniversary, Bangladesh will be a
middle-income nation with marked by economic development and initiative, including the
alleviation of poverty, the meeting of basic needs, and a robust healthcare, housing, and
education sector.97
The restrictionist immigration policies directed at the Rohingya by the Awami League
can also be linked to their “Vision 2021” political manifesto. In an effort to reach the goals laid
out in the plan, a high degree of economic control is required. This runs anathema to the liberal
economy envisioned by parties like the BNP. According to Gary Freeman’s theory on
immigration policy and economics, an increase in immigration is conducive to a classically
liberal economy, rather than a welfare state.98 Therefore, the social democratic goals enshrined
in the party’s founding constitution and the necessary reforms needed to reach their 2021 goal,
the restriction of Rohingya into Bangladesh is in the Awami League’s best interest. In order to
alleviate the poverty of the country and bolster the healthcare and education system, the
introduction of hundreds of thousands of additional potential citizens cannot be accepted. Too
large of a strain will be put on the social institutions the Awami League wishes to implement.
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THE BANGLADESH NATIONALIST PARTY
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Social Values
As mentioned, the BNP differentiated itself from the Awami League in Bangladesh’s first
years by adopting a Muslim-centric stance. They did not see the new country as a secular state
to stand apart from Pakistan, but a nation of Muslims that should embrace its common religious
identity and reach out to the broader Muslim world. This adoption of Bangladeshi nationalism
based on Islam was the motive first used by party founder General Zia-ur-Rahman that laid the
foundation for the military leadership of General Hussein Muhammad Ershad during the
1980’s.99 This Islamic nationalism continues into the current BNP party leadership. Rahman’s
daughter, Khaleda Zia, the current leader of the BNP, has developed a partnership with Jamaat-eIslami leaders based on their shared Islamic values. While Jamaat-e-Islami prefers a Bangladesh
under fundamental, Islamist Sharia Law, the two parties have united in their opposition to the
Awami League.100
According to my thesis, the warmer a political party is to Islam, the warmer they will act
towards to Rohingya migrants. This can be explained, largely, by the work of Jonathan Fox. He
posits that the policy making body’s religious makeup has a direct relationship with the policies
that that body imposes. If the body in question, in this case the BNP, shares the same religion
with the group in question, the Rohingya, there will be less discrimination within the policies.101
The Rohingya also serve the BNP electorally. Along with the calls for rights for the migrants,
the BNP is a staunch supporter of free elections in Bangladesh. Being vote-maximizers, the
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BNP will benefit from the religious ties the party shares with the Rohingya. To understand the
support the Rohingya have for the BNP and vice versa, it is important to understand the
ethnolinguistic similarities between Bengalis and Rohingya. They are both Indo-Aryan peoples
that share language similarities native to South. As a party founded on Bengali selfdetermination and national pride, it is natural for the BNP and the Rohingya to have an affinity
for one another, as they share largely the same ethnicity, language, and religious characteristics.
The BNP has proven the above theses in their policies concerning the Rohingya. Sharing an
ethnic and Muslim identity, the BNP, in its opposition, has called for the Awami League to end
their discrimination against the group and give them the rights that they are entitled to as
refugees.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Political Ideologies
As the final variable I will discuss pertaining to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, I
hypothesize that the BNP’s stances on democracy and nationalism, as components of their whole
political ideology, will inform their policies concerning the Rohingya. I will also include the
complimentary values of foreign policy as a compliment to the party’s stance on nationalism,
and economic policy as a compliment to the party’s stance on the role of liberal democracy.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Nationalism
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is inherently a nationalistic party. Before Bangladesh’s
inception, the BNP’s founder was a leader in the Liberation War with Pakistan, even reading the
official declaration of independence from Pakistan from a captured radio station in
Chittagong.102 It is this strong sense of nationalism that has informed the party’s policies from
the beginning. Zia sought to separate itself from the Awami League’s pro-India stance, create a
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Bangladeshi identity based on Islam, and strengthen the nation economically through selfsufficiency.103 These policies are enshrined in a 19-point program that serves as the party’s
founding manifesto. According to that founding document, "The sovereignty and independence
of Bangladesh, golden fruits of the historic liberation struggle, is our sacred trust and inviolable
right."104
That nationalism plays a role in a party’s attitude towards Rohingya migrants is also
central to my thesis. I posit that the more nationalistically minded a party is, the more likely they
will pursue inclusionary policies concerning the migrants. Normally this would not be true as
nationalism is a tried and true insulation from migrant acceptance. However, this holds true in
the case of the BNP for two reasons. Firstly, the BNP is the largest opposition party to the ruling
Awami League that has pursued globalist policies and is seen by many Bangladeshi nationals as
having to close of a relationship to India at the expense of Bangladeshi interests. More
importantly, the ruling party has pursued exclusionary policies against the Rohingya migrants.
To prove their opposition mettle, the BNP has expressed support for the Rohingya migrants.
Secondly, the BNP has formed a Bangladeshi nationalism based not on linguistic similarities, but
religious and sectarian overlaps, namely Islam. As the Rohingya migrants are a Muslim
minority, the BNP is more than willing to incorporate them into the Bangladeshi sphere to
strengthen their ranks both electorally and ideologically with the hundreds of thousands that are
taking shelter in Bangladesh.
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Bangladesh Nationalist Party Foreign Policy
The main opposition party in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has been a
strident supporter of the Rohingya. According to my hypothesis, this is due to a combination of
two factors: their social values and political ideologies. As I did with the Awami League, I will
discuss each area of policy and provide an analysis that explains that policy with their attitude
toward the Rohingya migrants. First, I will cover the BNP’s foreign policy, specifiacally their
relationship and stance with and towards India and Pakistan, Bangladesh’s most formidable
diplomatic partners.
As mentioned earlier, political parties in Bangladesh are largely defined by their
relationship with India, the superpower in South Asia. As Bangladesh’s most nationalistic party,
the relationship between the BNP and India is inherently one of tension. The party’s animosity
towards India goes back to the inception of Bangladesh soon after the Liberation War. Initially,
India and Bangladesh enjoyed a period of friendship and mutual respect after the war, united by
their mutual animosity towards Pakistan. Tides turned, however, when in 1975, General Zia-urRahman of the newly formed BNP assumed power in Bangladesh. Rahman moved away from
the purely linguistic nationalism in the country to one based on Islam, alienating the new country
from its Indian allies. India’s attempted cultural overtures to Bangladesh in order to resume
good relations backfired when the BNP perceived the good intentions as an Indian affront to the
new-found Bangladeshi nationalism. Rahman and his BNP viewed India as seeking to dilute the
hard-earned Bangladeshi nationalism with their own culture. As with most other South Asian
countries, Bangladesh, under the control of the BNP, also became wary of India’s growing
influence in the region. Being an anti-India party was a quick way to prove the party’s
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nationalist credentials.105 That animosity towards India still serves as the party’s mission
statement today. The BNP, while not in power after boycotting the 2014 elections in
Bangladesh, regularly condemns the Awami League for their close ties with Modi’s India.106
In addition to its relationship with India, the policy positions the BNP takes against
Pakistan is also vital to understanding the foreign policy of the party. Despite the BNP’s
reputation as a nationalistic party, it understands the cultural similarities that Bangladesh and
Pakistan share, namely Islam as the dominant religion. Attempts were made to reconcile the two
nations under the BNP’s leadership in the years following the war. With Rahman emphasizing
the importance of religion, an effort was made to normalize relations between the former
enemies. Ties were also strengthened in order to bolster a mutual stance against India as a
growing hegemonic threat in the region. This friendship between the BNP and Pakistan has been
maintained today by the BNP’s current leader Khaleda Zia. The relationship today, however,
has turned more sinister with India accusing the BNP of aiding Pakistani intelligence in their
campaign against India.107 Nevertheless, the friendly relationship with Pakistan has been a
hallmark policy of the BNP in Bangladeshi politics.
So how have the relationships with India and Pakistan affected the BNP’s attitude
towards the Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh? Much like the underlying justification of their
diplomatic ties with India and Pakistan, it has to do with the party’s nationalistic goals. The
BNP has carefully cultivated a Bangladeshi nationalism rooted in religious identity, namely
Islam. This has pitted the party against India, a largely Hindu nation, and united it with Pakistan,
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a country that shares a common religious identity. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority
escaping ethnic cleansing in their native Myanmar. They have garnered support from most
major Muslim states, including, most importantly, Pakistan.108 Over the years, after the
successive Rohingya persecutions in Myanmar, a sizable diaspora of 300,000 of the minority has
established itself in Karachi, raising money for the refugees currently fleeing Myanmar.109 The
sectarian Pakistani support is also shared by the BNP, leading to the BNP’s support of the
Rohingya’s plight, also. That the Rohingya support will add to the BNP’s power as a political
force in Bangladesh and against India also informs the party’s attitude toward the migrant group.
As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” policy has influenced his stance that the
Rohingya crisis is one that needs to be solved internally by Myanmar. In order to counter this,
the BNP has made a point to criticize the Awami League for supporting this position.110
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Democracy
First, I will cover the BNP’s stance on democracy over their years as a political force in
Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party was one of the first proponents and implementers
of liberal democracy in Bangladesh. After a series of coups that displaced the Awami League
leadership in the early 1970’s, after the creation of the independent state, General Zia-ur-Rahman
rose to power and created the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. As a key figure in the Liberation
War, General Zia was bolstered by his Bangladesh nationalism, his belief that Islam is the
religion of Bangladesh, and, most importantly, his dedication to moving Bangladesh in the
direction of liberal democracy. Upon becoming President in 1977, he began transitioning
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leadership positions from the military to civilians, illustrated by his barring of military colleagues
from holding cabinet and military positions.111 In 1978, Zia announced that there would be
elections held to “pave the way for democracy”. In addition, he lifted the previous ban on
political parties and intimated his intention to amend the constitution to allow for independent
judiciary as well as a "sovereign parliament."112
Today, under the leadership of Zia’s widow, Begum Khaleda Zia, the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party has continued Zia’s vision of democracy in Bangladesh. Throughout the
1980’s, as Bangladesh was controlled by the Ershad military regime, the BNP refused to
participate in government as they saw the regime illegitimate.113 It was Ershad who was behind
the assignation of Zia, ending the slow progression towards democracy. Under the current
Awami League rule, the BNP finds itself again barred from government by a highly
undemocratic party. It is from this position that the BNP has called for the implementation of a
caretaker government to oversee free and fair elections.114
According to my hypothesis, the warmer a party is to democracy, the warmer their stance
will be on the Rohingya migrants. This is true in the case of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
since the influx of the minority group in the past five years. As proponents of democracy, the
BNP supports the assimilation and normalization of the Rohingya minority, as they are a votemaximizing entity. Going back to the theory of Gary Freeman, the BNP would benefit from the
Rohingya electorally if they were able to participate in elections. It is this prospect of votes that
will return the party to power that plays a part in driving their policies towards the migrants.
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Bangladesh Nationalist Party Economics
Economics also plays a sizable role in the formation of political ideology for the BNP.
Part of the 19-point program previously mentioned, economic self-sufficiency is integral to the
Bangladeshi people, according to the BNP. As opposed to the Awami League, which sees itself
as the center-left party, the BNP is firmly in the center-right with their nationalistic tendencies
and their classically economic ideals. From the beginning of the party, an economy based on
Bangladeshi nationalism was their goal. With that vision in mind, Zia set out to emphasize a
market that as decentralized, free, and focused on agriculture and industry. To that end, the
leader traveled the Bangladeshi countryside to encourage rural farmers to produce more foods
and grains to meet the demands of the self-sufficiency ideal. While creating multiple programs
to bolster rural development, including the Bangladesh Jute and Rice research institutes, he also
moved to de-collectivize farms to promote the private sector and increase exports. In his
liberalization pursuit, Zia and the BNP were able to reduce quotas and restrictions on agriculture
and industrial activities.115
The economics of the BNP plays a large role in their acceptance of migrants, also. The
decentralized, private economy that the BNP envisions is conducive to the integrations of the
Rohingya in the following way: according to Freeman’s theory, the liberal democracy that grants
its economy a high degree of liberalism will have business interests that will benefit from the
inclusionary immigration policies, as that means more labor at a cheaper cost. This holds
especially true in Bangladesh where unskilled labor makes up the lion’s share of the labor force
in the country.116
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JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI
Jamaat-e-Islami Social Values
Jamaat-e-Islami’s social values inform all of their subsequent values and policies. Jamaat
was founded as a political movement that seeks to transform society into an Islamic state through
modern revolutionary means. This involves a revisionist method that aims to replace the leaders
of a current, secular state with those that will work to transform the state into one based on
Islamic values and Sharia law. Jamaat works within the contemporary democratic framework of
a country to achieve their ultimate goals. Because of these goals, the Bangladesh Jamaat-eIslami hold very strong pro-Islamic values.
According to Maidul Islam, the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh can largely be
attributed to the failure of a secular-nationalist state that was created when Bangladesh achieved
independence.117 The government following the creation of the state failed to address and
eradicate the extreme poverty and man-made famine that afflicted the Bangladeshi people in the
early years of the state. Under pressure to solve the nation’s problems, the leader at the time, the
Awami League’s Mujib, resorted to repressive measures that meant the banning of political
parties and the concentration of power in the executive branch, rendering Mujib as the absolute
ruler of Bangladesh.118 This fermented the Jamaat movement in Bangladesh and, as a result,
when the party was reinstated by Zia through the BNP, Jamaat regained power built upon the
Muslim identity of Bangladesh revived by the BNP and Zia.
Today, the party again finds itself barred from participating in elections by the ruling
Awami League, without a ruler (executed by the Awami League) and partnering with the BNP to
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oppose the current leadership in Bangladesh. As an Islamist revisionist party, Jamaat relies upon
the polls to regain power and diffuse their idea of an Islamic state. The region in which most of
the Rohingya migrants reside has historically been an electoral stronghold by Jamaat. 119 The
massive influx of Rohingya could mean a huge number of voters for the Jamaat party if they are
granted voting rights in Bangladesh. Bur first, Jamaat must prove to the Rohingya that they
support their cause and share the same religious identity. It is the mutual trust based on religion
that plays a vital role in Jamaat’s vocal support for the Rohingya in both Myanmar, but more
importantly, Bangladesh.
Jamaat-e-Islami Political Ideologies
The final variable that I will discuss pertaining to Jamaat-e-Islami is their political
ideology in the form of their stance on democracy and nationalism, with the complimentary
values of foreign policy (for nationalism) and economic policy (for democracy). As a primarily
religious party, the exact policies regarding each arena of domestic politics as a predictor of their
attitude toward the Rohingya is a little murky. Their religiosity has a much better direction of
causation. Despite this, it is important to understand their worldly ideologies as they contribute
to the logistics of Rohingya assistance.
Jamaat-e-Islami Nationalism
As mentioned, I hypothesize that the more nationalistically minded a political party is,
the warmer it will be toward Rohingya migrants. The Bangladesh Jamaat party is not
nationalistic in the conventional sense of the term. In fact, Maududi was a staunch critic of
nationalism as he sought to unite the Muslim world along the lines of Islam, not any nation.120
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As a religious-political movement, the party is inherently un-nationalistic in the sense that they
see nation-states incompatible with Islam, hence Maududi’s indifference, if not opposition, to the
creation of Pakistan as a home for Indian Muslims. When it comes to the Bangladesh Jamaat,
the party, then the Pakistan Jamaat, was opposed to the creation of the independent state of
Bangladesh. Today, the party works within the confines of the Bangladeshi state and recognizes
it as such, but still holds a favorable relationship with Pakistan, highlighting the party’s lack of
Bangladeshi nationalism.
The relationship between Jamaat and the BNP is key to understanding how the party’s
nationalism, or lack of it, informs their attitude toward Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. While
Jamaat expresses a lack of national pride in their politics, their main and crucial political ally, the
BNP, does. It is for this reason that we see Jamaat voicing support for the Rohingya migrants.
The Rohingya provide a bolster for the BNP’s nationalist leanings, helping the party toward their
goal of returning to power in Bangladesh. Because the BNP has a chance of returning to the
Bangladeshi parliament, their coalition partner, Jamaat, will likely return with them.
Jamaat-e-Islami Foreign Policy
Despite being shut out from Bangladeshi politics for much of the party’s existence,
Jamaat-e-Islami still serves as a powerful actor in the country’s politics. As the most noteworthy
and impactful Islamist party in Bangladesh, Jamaat has voiced their support for the Rohingya
migrants that are taking shelter in the state. As with the other two parties I have discussed, I will
cover Jamaat policies concerning foreign policy, social values, and their political ideologies and
how they, in turn, influence their stance on the Rohingya migrants. Maidul Islam’s Limits of
Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh provides perhaps the most
comprehensive information on the Jamaat-e-Islami movement as a political force in Bangladesh,
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giving an in-depth look at the party as a political entity rather than a radical religious movement,
as most other researchers have. In discussing Jamaat, I will use primarily his work as a source
for information
According to the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement, Syed Ab’ul Ala Maududi,
the party is based in Islamism. Therefore, any sense of nationalism or deep recognition of any
state that is not an Islamic state is insidious and inherently un-Islamic.121 However, as a political
movement, the Bangladesh Jamaat is forced to take a side when it comes to foreign policy
concerning India and Pakistan. Even Maududi, who opposed the creation of Pakistan,
understood the need to play the game of politics to advance his ideals of Islam. Furthermore,
because the party experienced the most pivotal moments of its history in each country, Jamaat in
Bangladesh, out of political necessity, takes a policy position on India and Pakistan.
While in a coalition government with the BNP during the mid-2000’s, Jamaat and the
BNP shared a similar stance towards India, one that was cold. According to a Jamaat
intellectual, India has always exploited Bangladesh regarding trade and water rights. 122
Moreover, according to another intellectual, the anti-Indian sentiment, or rather the cold Indian
relationship he describes it as, originates from the Indian hostility towards Jamaat, not from
Jamaat itself.123 This animosity directed at Jamaat stems from the support the group lent
Pakistan during the Liberation War. Therefore, the feelings between Jamaat and India are
largely derived from the geo-political history of the Indian subcontinent, not contemporary
politics or ideology. However, it can be said that Jamaat, because of its alliance with the BNP,
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takes its stance against India purely to oppose the Awami League, which they, along with the
BNP accuse of being outwardly pro-Indian.
The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami has an integral relationship with Pakistan that goes back
to the movement’s roots. During the Liberation War, Jamaat supported a united Pakistan.
Because the main motivation behind the secession from Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh
was one of ethno-linguistic nationalism, largely fostered by the Awami League and, initially the
BNP, the Jamaat-e-Islami chapter in Pakistan opposed it, rightly claiming the justification was
one of secular, not Islamic, nature. This was inherently contradictory to the movement’s
founding principle of creating a state based wholly on Islam. Additionally, after the war and
Bangladesh’s independence, Jamaat lived in exile in Pakistan until the ban on the party was lifted
by Zia, then leader of Bangladesh through the BNP. Today, Jamaat again finds itself barred
from participating in government by the ruling Awami League, using the Jamaat’s support of
Pakistan as its primary justification of the ban.124
Jamaat-e-Islami has been a vocal supporter of the Rohinga in Bangladesh.125 While it is
easy to chalk this up to pure sectarian commonalities, Jamaat’s foreign policy also plays a role in
the decision, too. As mentioned before, India has been a staunch advocate for Myanmar after the
implementation of Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” policy. In an effort to court Modi, the
Awami League has gotten on board with the policy, taking pressure off Myanmar to solve the
crisis. Due to the animosity that the Awami League and India has shown Jamaat, it is natural
that the party announce a policy that would counter India’s and the Awami League’s on the
Rohingya.
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Jamaat’s relationship with Pakistan is vital to understanding their position on the
Rohingya migrants. Being a party that has very close ties with the northern neighbor of
Bangladesh, Jamaat also represents Pakistan’s interests in Bangladesh, which are largely
religious. This sectarian bond between the Bangladesh Jamaat and Pakistan is one of the driving
forces that is compelling the party to take positive action on behalf of the minority group. Like
much of the Muslim world, Pakistan has called for support of the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar,
and for the safety of the migrants in other countries. Pakistan’s support can be attributed to the
common religion that the country shares with the Bangladesh Rohingya and the large Rohingya
refugee population that has established a sizeable diaspora in Pakistan. 126 These combining
factors drive the support of Jamaat in Bangladesh for the Rohingya.
Jamaat-e-Islami Democracy
First, I will cover Jamaat’s stance on democracy. As an Islamist party, many believe that
the party pursues methods of governing that follow Islamic law: a theocracy that lacks free and
fair elections that are hallmarks of liberal democracy. However, once the party succeeds in
transforming the state into one that practices Islamic law, the Islamic state would follow the
democratic and republican values of the caliphate.127 Additionally, the party was specifically
designed to work within the conventional democratic state.

In the pre-partition years, Jamaat-e-

Islami was created as an effort to transform India into a modern Islamic state, not by any violent
revolution, but through revisionism. Maududi sought to transform society from the top down:
beginning with the leaders who will, in turn, diffuse it down through the rest of the state.
Therefore, Jamaat is designed to work within democracy. While they pull no punches criticizing
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“Western cultural globalization”, Jamaat in Bangladesh has accepted liberal parliamentary
democracy as means to an end. Working within Bangladeshi parliamentary politics allows the
party to express itself in periodic elections to elect organizational leadership, debates,
discussions, and consultations for policy making.128
This utilization of contemporary, secular parliamentary governing in Bangladesh is
important when considering Jamaat’s support for the Rohingya. As mentioned before, because
of the shared sectarian identities and values in Islam, the Rohingya act as a boon to Jamaat
electoral hopes. This relationship would be moot if the Rohingya could not offer a path back to
the government for Jamaat. Even the ruling Awami League has voiced their concern about
Jamaat exploiting the Rohingya crisis for political gain.129 Despite the dubious ethical motives
behind Jamaat’s support for the migrants, the fact that the Rohingya may play an important role
for the party as a voting base is vital to understanding and predicting their warm reception for the
persecuted group.
Jamaat-e-Islami Economics
Finally, the economics of the Bangladesh Jamaat is one that shifts with the political
environment. It cannot be confined to such characteristics as liberal, socialist, protectionist, or
regulated because, ideally, the society would be based on Islamic law as an “alternative” to both
capitalism and socialism.130 However, according to Islam (author), Jamaat vacillates between
the economic systems of two competing forms of politico-ideological actors in Bangladesh: the
old, nationalist-populist regimes and those who propose economic liberalism, the Awami League
dominating the former and the BNP the latter.131 This fits into what I have characterized Jamaat
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as expressing themselves politically: aligning themselves with the BNP to regain entry into the
Bangladeshi political arena. The author goes on to describe Jamaat as a political actor that
operates on the margins of the politico-ideological discourse that attacks the power bloc from the
outside.132 The party keeps alive the sentiments of deprivation, inequality, and discrimination
that fuels their battle against the party in power. The Bangladesh Jamaat are currently locked in
a battle with the Awami League, siding with the BNP. This causes Jamaat to assume the
economic structure that the BNP prefers, which is a liberal economy.
As mentioned earlier, the BNP’s economic ideology of a free-market has influenced their
stance on the Rohingya in that they prefer an inclusionary policy as the migrants will feed the
Bangladeshi economy that is already based on unskilled labor. Because Jamaat-e-Islami is
currently on the politico-ideological side of the BNP, they also share this opinion.
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CONCLUSION
The integration and assimilation of immigrants and refugees and the policies governing
them has been researched thoroughly. Security, nationalism, ethnicity all play a role in the
policies that are enacted when it comes to migrants residing in the host country. What appears to
be less researched is domestic party politics as a determinant to immigration policy, especially in
a developing country where party politics amounts to little more than factional fighting for
control of a country. This paper highlighted the importance of party politics in determining
immigration policy by selecting three parties within Bangladesh and reconciling the ideologies of
those parties with the distinct policy they have on Rohingya migrants. The Awami League,
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and Jamaat-e-Islami maintain distinct social and political attitudes
that influence their stance on the Rohingya migrants. Studying Bangladesh and its political
dynamics provides interesting insight to how a developing country, prone to faction competition,
enacts immigration policy.
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RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
While the methodology and findings of this study have utilized the latest information on
the crisis of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and Myanmar, this is an ever-developing situation and
at the time of publication may fail to include the most recent of developments that could change
the findings of the study. I also make some assumptions about the Rohingya voting tendencies.
These are based on the theoretical and empirical findings of scholars who have completed
literature on immigration policy and party politics, Gary Freeman’s work in particular. I rely on
his work that links immigration policy to vote-maximizing political parties. I also rely on
Jonathan Fox’s work that links patterns of systematic discrimination to ethnic makeup, making a
connection between discrimination, voting, and immigration policy. Unfortunately, empirical
evidence of Rohingya voting tendencies are unavailable as they are a stateless group and have
been denied the right to vote in both Myanmar and Bangladesh. For future research, it would be
imperative to visit and interview a swath of Rohingya immigrants, both for their accounts of their
treatment at the hands of the Bangladeshi government and their attitude towards the political
parties that I have discussed in this study. The Rohingya crisis, is one that is quickly becoming
dire. It is vital for popular as well as academic attention to remain on the actions of both the
Burmese and Bangladeshi governments.
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